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CASES NOTED
WILLS-CLASSIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE BEQUESTS
Plaintiff-church, a general legatee, brought an action to determine
the construction of a will with reference to certain bequests of stock to
other legatees. The bequest provided for a stated number of shares
of identified stock. In the event the shares were sold before the testator's
demise, the legatees were to receive in cash the market value of the
stock. Held, such bequests were general bequests and should abate along
with plaintiff's other general bequest. Park Lake Presbyterian Church v.
Estate of Henry, 106 So.2d 215 (Fla. App. 1958).
For the purposes of abatement' the distinctions between specific,
demonstrative acd general legacies arc quite simple in theoiy. However,
the application of the respective definitions to any given set of facts has
given the courts considerable difficulty. A specific bcquest2 is a gift created
by a will of a particular thing, or part thereof, which is capable of specific
identification and which can be isolated or set apart from the general
assets of the testator. In order to satisfy a specific bequest, only that
thing itself can be given and if it is no longer extant at the date of the
testator's demise it is considered adecmed and the specific legatee loses all.3
Harlan v. Alvarez 4 illustrates a specific bequest. There the testator provided

1. Abatement of a legacy or legacies takes place when the testator's assets at
death are not sufficient to pay all the legacies, the debts of the testator and the
administration expenses. See in re Buck's Estate, 32 Cal. App.2d 372, 196 P.2d
769 (1948); In re Estate of Neistrath, 66 Cal. 330, 331, 5 Pac. 507, 508 (1885)
(quoting from Bouvier's Law Dictionary); In re Van Wechel's Estate, 241 Iowa 513,
41 N.W.2d 694 (1950); In re Estate of Hartman, 233 Iowa 405, 9 N.W.2d 359
1943); Temple v. First Nat'l. Bank of Meridan, 202 Miss. 92, 30 So.2d 605 (1947).
ee collection of cases cited in 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1153 (1957).
2. Coforth v. Goforth, 202 Ark. 1017, 154 S.\V.2d 819 (1941); Burham v. Mayford,
141 Conn. 96, 104 A.2d 217 (1954); Lenten v. Miller, 378 I11. 170, 37 N.E.2d 833
(1941); In re Lepley's Estate, 235 Iowa 664, 17 N.V.2d 526 (1945). See collection of
cases cited in 57 Am. Jun. Wills § 1401 (1948); 96 C).S. 'Wills § 1153 (1957).
3. Wychoff v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n., 237 N.J. Super 274, 117 A.2d
162 (1955); Righter v. First Reformed Church of Boonton, 17 N.J. Super. 407,

86 A.2d 305 (1952); In re Smallinan's Estate, 138 Misc. 889, 247 N.Y. Supp. 593
(Surt. Ct. 1931). See collection of cases cited in 57 Am. ]U. \Vills § 1401 (1948); 96

C.J.S. Wills § (1957).
4. 70 R.I. 21), 38 A.2d 158 (1944) The testators' bequests in the following
cases were held to be specific: In re Buck's Estate 32 Cal. App.2d 372, 196 P.2d
769 (1948) (Where there were beqtests of stock represented by a trustee's certificate);
Taylor v. Hill, 121 Kan. 102, 245 Iac. 1026 (1926) (The U.S. government war bonds
bequeathed were specifically described); Butler v. Dobbins, 142 Me. 383, 53 A.2d 270
(1947) (Testator bequeathed 21 of the 65 shares of bank stock she held); In re
Mandelle s Estate, 252 Mich. 375, 233 N.W. 230 (1930) (Testator bequcathed 1200
shares of par value stock and at the time of her death these shares had been exchanged
for 6000 no par shares); Adams v. Conqueror Trust Co., 358 Mo. 763, 217 S.\V.2d
476 (1949) (Testator bequeathed the same number of shares of stock he owned);
Fidelity Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. lIlvey, 319 Mo. 192, 5 S.W.2d 437 (1927)
(Testator owned a large number of shares of a certain corporation and bequeathed
a part thereof); O'Day v. O'Day, 193 Mo. 62, 91 SA.
921 (1906) (Testator
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that all the stock which had been bequeathed to her by her mother's will
should in turn be given to the testator's legatee. A demonstrative bequest'
is an unconditional gift which indicates the fund out of which it is to
be satisfied. It can take the form of a gift of a specific amount of stock,
money or similar substance. In Young v. Young B it was held that a
bequest of $1000 to a son which was to be satisfied from the sale of a
government bond, but which did not indicate any particular bond, was
a demonstrative bequest. A demonstrative bequest is peculiar in that
it is a combination of both the specific and general bequests. 7 In the
respect that a specific sum is bequeathed, it is similar to the general
bequest, but it approaches the specific bequest by specifying a particular
fund." Although it approaches a specific bequest it is really more of a
general bequest and if the specific fund fails, the legacy will be satisfied
out of the general estate.9 A general bequest is one which is satisfied
neither by the delivery of a specific isolated thing nor payment from a
particular fund but which "is satisfied out of the general assets of testator's
estate."' 0 The general legacy does require a specified quantity or amount.'
bequeathed railroad bonds in the hands of an agent or in the event of their sale the
proceeds thereof); Polliak v. Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 365, 88 A.2d 351 (1952) (Testator
made three bequests each of an amount on deposit in a certain bank); In re Dreyfus
Estate, 192 Misc. 509, 82 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (Testator bequeathed the
exact amount of stock he owned); In re Morphy's \Vill, 70 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Surr, Ct.
1947) (Testator bequeathed "all my shares of stock"); In re Anslingcr's Estate, 185
Misc. 827, 57 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Surr. Ct. 1945) (Testator bequeathed funds in two
banks); In re Davis' Will, 184 Misc. 952, 57 NA .S.2d 356 (1945) (Testator bequeathed
to various persons certain numbers of shares of stock of specific corporations); Crawford
v. McCarthy, 159 N.Y. 514, 54 N.E. 277 (1899) (Testator bequeathed funds in his
account on deposit).
5. Taylor v. Hull, 121 Kan. 102, 245 Pac. 1026 (1926); Gidden v. Cidden,
176 Miss. 98, 167 So. 785 (1936); In re Lewis' Estate, 148 Neb. 592, 28 N.W.2d
427 (1947); In re Anslinger's Estate, 185 Misc. 827, 57 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Surr. Ct. 1945);
In re Cameron's Estate, 278 N.Y. 352, 16 N.E.2d 362 (1938). See collection of cases
cited in 57 Au. Jun. \Vills § 1403 (1948); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1125 (1957).
6. 202 Ca. 649, 44 S.E.2d 659 (1947). The testators' bequests in the following
cases were held to be demonstrative: Spinney v. Eaton, 111 Mc. 1, 87 At]. 378
(1913) (Testator owned 1830 shares and made two bequests of 50 shares each and
then sold the remaining 1730 shares); Dryden v. Owings, 49 Md. 356 (1878)
(Testator bequeathed $8000 in bonds and at his death possessed $8000 in bonds);
In re Coldborg's Estate, 148 Misc. 607, 266 N.Y. Supp. 106 (Surr. Ct. 1933)
(Testator bequeathed bonds owned by him to value of $15,000).
7. In re Dietmann's Estate, 108 Colo. 508, 119 P.2d 611 (1941); Lenzen v.
Miller, 378 I11. 170, 37 N.E.2d 833 (1941); In re Lewis' Estate, 148 Neb. 592,
28 N.W.2d 427 (1947). See collection of cases cited in 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1125 (1957).
8. Lenzen v. Miller, 378 Ill. 170, 37 N.E.2d 833 (1941); In re Phin's Will,
99 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re Kingsley's Will, 67 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Surr. Ct.
1946), In re Sexton's Estate, 166 Misc. 631, 4 N.Y.S.2d Ill (Surr. Ct. 1938).
9. Hcitlenger v. McNallis, 243 Ala. 560, 11 So.2d 143 (1942); Lenzen v. Miller,
378 Il. 170, 37 N.E.2d 833 (1941); In re Child's Will, 171 Misc. 791, 13 N.Y.S.2d
907 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Mellott's Estate, 162 Ohio St. 113, 121 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
See collection of cases cited in 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1125 (1957).
10. Bond v. Evans, 92 Colo. 1, 17 P.2d 311 (1932); Burnham v. layford, 141
Conn. 96, 104 A.2d 217 (1954); Young v. Young, 202 Ga. 694, 44 S.E.2d 659
(1947); In re Mellott's Estate, 162 Ohio St. 113, 121 N.E.2d 7 (1954). See collection
of cases cited in 57 Am. JuR. Wills § 1402 (1948); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1125 (1957).
11. Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464, 85 Pac. 846 (1906); W,\eed v. Hage, 85 Conn.
490, 83 Atl. 636 (1912); Baker v. Baker, 319 i11. 320, 150 N.E. 284 (1925); Tagnon
Adm'x. v. Tagnon, 253 Ky. 374, 69 S.WV.2d 714 (1934). See collection of cases cited
in 57 Am. JuR. Wills § 1402 (1948); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1125 (1957).
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In In re McDougald's Estate12 it was held that bequests of a certain

number of shares of certain stocks to named individuals were general
bequests. Similarly in Evans v. Hunter13 bequests of $4000 in government
bonds to one daughter and $1000 in bonds to a second daughter were
held to be general bequests when the testator owned United States bonds
totaling $5000.
In the case under consideration, the Florida District Court of Appeal,
Second District held that a bequest of a certain number of shares of stock
was a general bequest in spite of the fact that the testator had incorporated
an alternative bequest of cash in lieu thereof if such shares of stock
were sold before his death. 14 The court pointed out that bequests of
stock are general where no fund is created to satisfy the bequest and
where specific shares are not identified.'5 It was further set forth in
0 that an
In re Beecroft's Estate"
alternative feature did not change a
general bequest into a demonstrative one. In that case the court held
that the mere fact that the testator had provided for his executor to
pay a legacy in securities in lieu of cash did not make a general bequest
demonstrative since there was no reference to a fund. Similarly in
Industrial Trust Co. v,Tidd", the Rhode Island court held that a bequest
of $2000 in stock was a general bequest and the fact that the testator
had provided that the legatee could take cash of equal value instead
of stock did not render the bequest demonstrative. The court in the instant
case concluded that "the alternative feature is nothing but a statement
of the law applicable to a general legacy. It is simply a measuring vessel
by which the beneficiary would receive the equivalent of the gift intended
by the testator."' 8

The dissent in the principal case concluded in theory that for the
purposes of abatement the distinction between specific and demonstrative

12. 149 Fla. 468, 6 So.2d 275 (1942).

13. 86 Iowa 413, 53 N.W. 277 (1892). In the following cases the testators'
bequests were held to be general: Bond v. Evans, 92 Colo, 1, 17 P.2d 311 (1932)
(Testator owned sixteen shares of stock at his death and had bequeathed fifteen
shares to one legatee); Palmer v. Palmer's Estate, 106 Me. 25, 75 Atl. 130 (1909)
(Testator bequeathed twenty shares of a certain stock to one daughter and twelve
shares of other stock to a second daughter without reference to any particular shares);
In re Fisher, 87 N.Y. Supp. 567 (App. Div. 1904) (Testator made bequests of specific
amounts to several persons in a safe deposit box but at testator's death the contents
could not be divided according to the terms of the will); In re Van Vliet, 5 Misc. 169,
25 N.Y. Supp. 922 (1893), (Testator made three bequests of government bonds the
total of which he owned at the date of bequest but at his death such bonds were at a
premium); Snyder's Estate, 217 Pa. 71, 66 Atl. 157 (1907); In re McFerren's Estate,
365 Pa, 490, 76 A.2d 759 (1950) (Testator bequeathed shares of a named corporation
and no such stock existed at his death).
14. Park Lake Presbyterian Church v. Estate of Henry, 106 So.2d 215 (Fla.
App.15.
19582.
N-.at 217.
16. 146 Misc. 344, 263 N.Y. Sutp. 142 (Surr, Ct. 1933).
17. 49 R.I. 188, 141 Atl. 464 1928).
18. See note 14 supra at 219.
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bequests is unimportant by virtue of a Florida statutory provision19 which
treats specific and demonstrative bequests as one unit. The alternative
feature of the bequest clearly created a specific bequest rather than a
general one.20 The dissent pointed out that in In re Vail's Estate2' a
bequest of "my five hundred shares" of certain corporate stock was a
specific bequest since this was all the stock of that corporation that the
22
testator possessed. The dissent distinguished In re McDougald's Estate
on the grounds that there were no possessory words such as "my" used in
the bequest in that case. Hence, the conclusion followed that it was a
general bequest.23 It was next shown that the alternative feature of the
bequest which stated "In event said stock has been sold then I hereby
give and bequeath to . . .an amount equal to the value at the time of

my death, of said stock" clearly illustrates an intent to give the specific
24
stock that the testator then owned and hence the bequest is specific.
The dissent, for further support, pointed to the principle that where a
5
legatee is a close relative he will be preferred to general legatees.2
This case is one of first impression in Florida and it is in accord
with the general rules of law as to what constitutes a general bequest. The
majority, concluding that the alternative element of the general bequest
would not render the bequest demonstrative, is in accord with Knox v.
Stamper.'2 In that case there was a bequest of a specific mortgage with
a further provision that if the mortgage was satisfied the legacy should
be paid by cash of equal value.' 7 The Maryland court in the Knox case
held that the bequest was specific and the alternative feature could not
render the bequest a general one. 28 The principal case follows the general
rule of law since there is a bequest of stock with a provision that should
the stocks be no longer in the testator's possession then the legatee should
receive cash in its stead.29 This is the same as providing for a bequest
of stock or cash in the alternative and since no specific fund is referred
to, the cash must be paid out of the general assets. Payment out of the
general assets of the testator, is the test of a general legacy since a specific
bequest is satisfied only by delivery of the specific item and a demonstrative
bequest must point out the fund to which it is to apply.20 Here, no specific
item is mentioned nor is there any fund specified.
19. FLA. STAT. § 734.06 (1957) which provides for an order of abatement. First,
residuary legacies abate ratably, then general, and then demonstrative and specific legacies
together as one unit.
20. See note 14 supra at 223.
21. 67 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1953).
22. 149 Fla. 468, 6 So.2d 274 (1942).
23. See note 14 supra at 223.
24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. 186 Md. 238, 46 A.2d 361 (1946).
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. In re Beecroft's Estate, 146 Misc. 344, 263 N.Y. Supp. 142 (Surr Ct. 1933);
Industrial Trust Co. v. Tidd, 49 R.I. 188, 141 AtI. 464 (1928).
30. Cases cited note 10 supra.

114

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIV

This case clearly illustrates the responsibility of the lawyer in drawing
a will in terms which will clearly express the testator's intent. If the
testator had wanted to give the defendant-relative preference over the
plaintiff, he could have done so by merely expressing such an intent and
it would have been given effect. In In re Van Brunt's Estate3' the New
York court held that where the testator's bequests indicated a preference
that her burial lot be cared for and that certain charities be preferred,
such intent would be given effect. The court further stated: "Preference
may be given to general over specific gifts if such is the express testamentary wish."3 2 Similarly in In re Weed's WillP" 3 the Wisconsin court stated:
"to establish a preference the words must be clear enough in their meaning
to show that it was the intention of the testatrix that the legacy should
not be on an equal footing with the others." If the testator fails to express
4
clearly such an intention the legacies will abate pro rata.8
BRUCE SPENCER REZNICK

31. 159 Misc. 105, 287 N.Y. Supp. 269 (1936). In the following cases the intent
of the testators as expressed in the bequests were given effect by the courts: In re
Flint's Estate, 40 Cal. App.2d 132, 104 P.2d 516 (1940) (Testator made bequests of
trust funds for his mother, wife, and sister-in-law and then provided that if there were
not enough funds to create the trusts the general legacies should abate); Morgan v.
Meacham, 279 Ky. 526, 130 S.W.2d 992 (1938) (Testator stated that residuary
bequests take subject to a preferred bequest); it re Goldstein's Will, 109 N.Y.S.2d
553 (Surr. Ct. 1951) (Testator gave one third of his estate to his wife and requested
such bequest to be preferred); In re Haslette's Estate, 190 Misc. 496, 74 N.Y.S.2d
294 (Strr. Ct. 1947) (Where the testator bequeathed one-third of the Temainder of his
estate to his wife absolutely and it was held such bequest was specific one); In re
Mass' Will, 65 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Surr. Ct. 1946) (Where the testator bequeathed one-third
of his estate to his wife and made two general bequests of $5000, the court held that the
testator had intended that the one-third be taken out before deduction of the $10,000);
In re Cases's Estate, 65 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584 (Surr. Ct. 1946) (The court stated that
preference of one legatee over another is to be ascertained from the language of the
will); In re Clark's Vill, 166 Misc. 909, 3 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Surt. Ct. 1938) (The
testator bequeathed $25,000 to a certain person and stated that this was to be given
preference over all other bequests); In re Smallman's Estate, 138 Misc. 889, 247
N.Y. Supp. 593 (Surr. Ct. 1931); in re Frankehelinser, 195 N.Y. 346, 88 N.E. 374
(1909) (Where the testator made general bequests to charities but provided for
preference to a life tenant and remainderman of the residue).
32. In re Van Brunt's Estate, 159 Misc. 105, 110, 287 N.Y. Supp. 269, 275 (Surr.
Ct. 1936).
33. 213 Wis. 574, 576, 252 N.W. 294, 296 (1934). See In re McDonald's
Estate, 314 Ill. App. 148, 151, 41 N.E.2d 128, 130 (1942) (The court stated: "A
preference or priority may be given a legatee of a general legacy if the intention of
the testator to give such preference appears beyond dispute by the terms of the will.");
In re Van Wechel's Estate, 241 Iowa 513, 517, 41 N.W.2d 694, 697 (1950) ('[he
court noted that if there is doubt as to preference of one legacy over another then no
preference will be given); Emery v. Bachelder, 78 Me. 233, 238, 3 AtI. 733, 735
(1886) ("no priority will be allowed where the expressions are ambiguous and do
not mark with certainty the testator's intention."); Porter v. Howe, 173 Mass. 521,
527, 54 N.E. 255, 256 (1899) (The court likewise held that if the expressions are
ambiguous no priority will be given); In re Van Brunt's Estate, 159 Misc. 105, 110,
287 N.Y. Supp. 269, 275 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ("preference will be given to general over
specific gifts if such is the express testamentary wish").
34. In re Van Wechel's Estate, 241 Iowa 513, 517, 41 N.W.2d 694, 697 (1950).

